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Abstract. Reducing the incidence of malaria has been a public health priority for nearly a century. New technolo-
gies and associated vector control strategies play an important role in the prospect of sustained reductions. The
development of the CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing system has generated new possibilities for the use of gene-drive
constructs to reduce or alter vector populations to reduce malaria incidence. However, before these technologies
can be developed and exploited, it will be necessary to understand and assess the likelihood of any potential harms
to humans or the environment. To begin this process, the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health and the
International Life Sciences Institute Research Foundation organized an expert workshop to consider the potential
risks related to the use of gene drives in Anopheles gambiae for malaria control in Africa. The resulting discussion
yielded a series of consensus points that are reported here.
INTRODUCTION
The control of malaria has been a global public health pri-
ority for almost 100 years.1 Concerted efforts in the 21st
century by national governments, international bodies, and
civil society organizations supporting public health programs
to reduce the spread and impact of malaria have reduced the
incidence of infection by 37% globally and mortality by 60%
since 2000. In Africa, it is estimated that measures against
malaria vectoring mosquitoes, notably the use of long-lasting
insecticidal bed nets (LLINs) and house spraying with resid-
ual insecticides (IRS), have contributed ∼78% of all gains
accrued against malaria since 2000. Nevertheless, more
than 3 billion people remain at risk for malaria infection, and
more than 200 million cases and over 400,000 deaths have
been attributed to malaria in 2015.† This burden falls dis-
proportionately on sub-Saharan Africa, where the deadliest
malaria parasite, Plasmodium falciparum, coexists with the
most efficient malaria vectors, including Anopheles gambiae
and Anopheles funestus.
Despite the key successes already achieved by major
malaria vector control tools like LLINs and IRS, new com-
plementary technologies are constantly being developed
and evaluated for use in control programs to bridge existing
gaps and accelerate progress toward eventual malaria elim-
ination. Practical advances in molecular biology, particu-
larly the successful use of the CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing
machinery to create gene drive,‡ are envisioned to make
more practical and realizable large-scale campaigns to
drastically suppress malaria vector populations or alter these
populations so they no longer transmit disease.2,3 However,
before these methods can be developed and deployed, it
will be necessary to assess their potential to cause harm to
human health and the environment.
With the goal to inform research programs, public health
and donor organizations and government regulators about
plausible risks related to potential uses of gene-drive tech-
nology in mosquitoes, the Foundation for the National Insti-
tutes of Health convened a 3-day workshop involving
expert participants with diverse perspectives to identify the
hazards. The workshop, which was facilitated by the Inter-
national Life Sciences Institute Research Foundation’s Cen-
ter for Environmental Risk Assessment, applied a problem
formulation approach to identify plausible risks using case
studies. The case studies were developed to illustrate real-
istic applications of gene drive for malaria vector control in
sub-Saharan Africa, particularly focusing on A. gambiae.
CONDUCT OF THE WORKSHOP
International experts including researchers, public health
officials, and regulatory officials participated in the 3-day
program. The first day consisted of background lectures on
1) the use of CRISPR/Cas-9 system to drive genetic con-
structs,4,5 2) the biology of A. gambiae,6 and 3) the problem
formulation process for planning risk assessment and iden-
tifying relevant concerns.7–9 Participants then conducted a
problem formulation exercise based on case studies provid-
ing background information and hypothetical examples illus-
trating potential uses of gene-drive strategies for population
suppression and population alteration by either introduc-
ing genes encoding novel proteins, or editing endogenous
genes in the mosquito. The end result was the identification
of pertinent environmental/ecological protection goals that
could plausibly be impacted by releasing genetically modi-
fied mosquitoes, followed by discussion of how those pro-
tection goals might reasonably be impacted. Consensus
from these discussions was then drafted to inform ongoing
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dialogue around use of gene-drive strategies against malaria
vectors, and to guide future in-depth risk assessments on
individual specific technologies employing population sup-
pression or population alteration. Although the many rich
discussions could not be captured in a series of consensus
statements, and nothing in these points is intended to pre-
clude consideration of other issues, we believe the stated
consensus notes will inform research and product develop-
ment efforts, specifically with regard to priorities for data
collection and analysis for environmental and ecological
risk assessments.
CONSENSUS POINTS
Two types of uses for gene drives in mosquitoes were
considered. Both are intended to contribute to the control
of malaria, but have different implications for potential envi-
ronmental interactions.
• Gene-drive mosquitoes for population suppression are
designed to eventually reduce in numbers in the envi-
ronment over a relevant time.
• Gene-drive mosquitoes for population alteration are
designed to persist in the environment over a relevant time.
In light of considerations for both of these applications of
the technology, participants discussed broad areas of envi-
ronmental protection that would be pertinent to consider
when performing environmental risk assessment for the use
of gene drive in A. gambiae. The first consensus was thus
on which broad protection goals were pertinent, and which
ones were nonpertinent (Box 1).
Participants acknowledged that A. gambiae does not inter-
act substantially with the air and soil in ways that are impor-
tant for environmental quality, or have relevant interactions
with natural resources and agricultural production other than
feeding on livestock. Instead, the relevant interactions in the
environment were related to human health and pathogen
transmission, interactions of A. gambiae with other organisms
in the environment, and its potential to transmit livestock
pathogens. Because the lifecycle of A. gambiae involves an
aquatic stage, and this stage feeds on microorganisms,
there was consensus that water quality should be consid-
ered, though these interactions were viewed as minor since
the mosquitoes prefer small and transient water bodies.
CONSENSUS POINTS RELATED TO PERTINENT
PROTECTION GOALS
Human health.
• The relevant interaction for human health is biting.
• Incidental exposure through inhalation, ingestion, etc. is
not likely to result in any significant levels of exposure
leading to harm to human health.
• Proteins introduced into A. gambiae, including compo-
nents of the gene drive and markers, should be consid-
ered with respect to toxicity and allergenicity potential.
• Horizontal gene flow to humans is extremely unlikely to occur.
• Because A. gambiae is an important disease vector,
consideration should be given to potential alterations in
disease transmission.
• This includes altered P. falciparum transmission or viru-
lence, other human malarial transmission as well as
altered transmission of other diseases.
Female Anopheles mosquitoes interact with humans
through biting to obtain blood nutrients necessary for egg
production. Although incidental exposures are possible
through inhalation and ingestion of the introduced gene-
drive mosquitoes, these exposures were considered unlikely
to cause harm. However, A. gambiae is known to transmit
other pathogens in addition to P. falciparum. Participants
identified potential alterations to disease transmission as an
important area of consideration for any future application,
understanding that the ability to affect disease transmission
would depend on the specific mechanism for achieving the
desired phenotype. Changes in endogenous proteins or gene
functions in A. gambiae should be assessed for their ability to
alter rates of transmission or virulence of P. falciparum as well
as alter the transmission of other Anopheles-transmitted
diseases. Introduced proteins should be considered for
potential toxicity and allergenicity to humans if the proteins
are likely to come in contact with humans through biting
(e.g., to be present in saliva of the transgenic mosquito).
Participants did not think horizontal gene flow was likely to
lead to harm to humans because of the extremely rare fre-
quency of occurrence10–12 and the expectation that intro-
duced genes would not be present in mosquito saliva.
Biodiversity.
• Anopheles gambiae is not a “keystone” species in the
environment and is not known to provide any non-
redundant ecosystem services.
• Changes in population size or even elimination of A. gambiae
from a particular environment are unlikely to harmbiodiversity
or ecosystem services. This is based on existing knowledge
and experience with vector control programs.
• Anopheles gambiae interacts with other species by
feeding on them, being consumed as prey, or compet-
ing with them.
• These interactions may require consideration for species
of relevance to the assessment such as threatened,
endangered, or valued species.
• Incidental contact between organisms andA. gambiae carry-
ing gene drives is not likely to lead to harms to those organ-
isms, compared with interactions with other A. gambiae.
• Anopheles gambiae is not known to be the sole or primary
food source for any organism, with the possible exception
of a few species of spider known to prefer anophelines.
• Removing A. gambiae from the environment is unlikely to
harm species that feed on it, due to the availability of
other prey, including anophelines.
• Consideration should be given to any proteins introduced
into A. gambiae (including gene-drive components or
markers) for toxicity to other species.
Pertinent broad protection goals Nonpertinent broad protection goals
Human health Soil quality
Biodiversity Air quality
Animal health (i.e., livestock) Natural resources (other than
biodiversity)
Water quality Agricultural production
(excluding animal health)
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• Gene flow to other species within the A. gambiae s.l.
complex through hybridization is likely, and does not
create additional pathways to harm.
• Horizontal gene transfer is not likely to occur to other
organisms on any relevant time scale and is not a perti-
nent pathway to harm.
Biodiversity as a protected endpoint is complex, and
any risk assessment is dependent on identification of
what aspects of biodiversity are considered valuable, and
what changes in biodiversity are considered to be harmful
or undesirable. Presentations and participants from sub-
Saharan countries provided some context for how biodiver-
sity is considered in the region, and participants also used
experience with existing vector control programs to inform
their discussions. It was generally agreed that populations
of A. gambiae are not locally valued or protected. Rather
they are treated as a nuisance and a public health threat
and subject to a variety of programs to reduce populations.
Most participants did not consider reduction or alteration
of these populations, in and of themselves, to represent a
harm to biodiversity.
The potential for ecological harm as a result of changes
or reductions in population is normally assessed through
consideration of interactions with other organisms in the
environment, and A. gambiae primarily interacts with other
organisms through feeding on them (humans and other
large mammals), serving as prey, or as a competitor with
other mosquito species in aquatic habitats during larval
stages. As mentioned above for human health, toxicity of
any introduced proteins for other species should be consid-
ered. Drawing from presented materials, and information
contained in the case studies, participants concluded that
the loss of A. gambiae from a particular environment would
be unlikely to cause ecological harm. Although this species
may be preyed on by many animals, it does not constitute
a significant or crucial portion of the diet for any known
species. Participants noted reports that certain spider spe-
cies prefer to feed on anophelines when available, but the
presence of other food sources in any particular environ-
ment makes the contribution of changes to A. gambiae
populations less likely to lead to harm.13
It was also noted that gene flow to other members
of what has been known as the A. gambiae complex
(A. gambiae s.l.), historically consisting of seven or eight
morphologically indistinguishable species that have some
potential for hybridization, is likely to occur. However,
the movement of gene drive to these species would be
expected to produce similar impacts on the environ-
ment as in A. gambiae. Participants recognized that this
gene flow should be accounted for in risk assessment,
but the consensus was that this would not produce any
additional pathways to harm for other valued species or
assessment endpoints. Indeed, because several of these
species also transmit malaria, acquisition of the gene-drive
construct could well be beneficial in further reducing dis-
ease transmission.
Animal health (livestock).
• Potential harm could result from altered pathogen trans-
mission dynamics to livestock.
• Harm resulting from other mechanisms, including toxicity
from introduced proteins, was considered unlikely.
Similar to humans, livestock animals interact with
A. gambiae primarily as targets of feeding. Therefore, the
consensus among participants was that potential for
altered disease transmission to livestock would need to be
addressed in risk assessments. Again, similar to humans,
livestock may ingest or inhale mosquitoes incidentally, but
these exposures are expected to be low and participants did
not think harm from these exposures would be consequen-
tial when considering the use of gene drives for population
alteration or suppression in A. gambiae. Although the
possibility of toxicity of proteins to livestock was considered
remote, this concern would be dealt with through considera-
tion of toxicity to humans, as noted above.
Additional considerations. The primary purpose of the
workshop was to consider the potential for environmental
or ecological harm from the use of gene-drive technology in
A. gambiae. This included consideration for human health
as a component of the environment. However, through the
course of the exercise, several recurring discussions sug-
gested that, although not directly related to environmental
risk assessment, some basic consensus points on the use
of this particular technology could be easily agreed and
should be considered by product developers, governments,
and public health programs.
• The use of gene drives in A. gambiae should be consid-
ered as a complementary strategy to other vector control
methods and malaria mitigation strategies.
• The potential harms identified for the use of gene
drive in A. gambiae should be considered in the con-
text of other vector control methods and malaria mitiga-
tion strategies.
• Failure to sustain a successful malaria vector control
strategy can have harmful effects on malaria incidence.
• This is not unique to gene drive, and would be the same
for other malaria control or eradication techniques.
• The ability to control disease resurgence needs to be
sustained and availability of effective additional control
methods assured.
The crux of these conclusions is to the importance of
placing the use of gene drives in the context of existing
malaria mitigation strategies. Gene-drive technology offers
opportunities for well-organized large-scale vector control
operations with potential to drastically suppress or alter
malaria vector populations to reduce or stop transmis-
sion. Decades of experience with vector control and malaria
control has provided valuable insight on the need for main-
taining the viability of multiple control methods. Despite the
novelty of the molecular biology and the excitement sur-
rounding the technology, there was strong consensus that
the idea that a single technology, or a single application of
a technology, would be sufficient to eradicate malaria trans-
mission is unrealistic. Gene-drive strategies hold promise
as a strong complement to other methods, but they are not
intended and should not be considered to be a single solu-
tion to malaria mitigation. The use of gene drives, and their
environmental risk assessment, will need to be considered
in this context, and be informed by relevant experiences
with other control methods.
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CONCLUSION
Problem formulation is a process for incorporating legal,
social, and scientific context into the planning for an envi-
ronmental or ecological risk assessment. It is a useful exer-
cise for formally identifying the types of information that
will be useful in conducting an assessment. This workshop
provided an opportunity for experts to consider, through a
case study approach, the ways a gene-drive strategy in
A. gambiae for mitigating malaria might harm the environ-
ment or human health. Definitions of harm were derived
from participants’ understanding of environmental protec-
tion goals in sub-Saharan Africa and informed by presen-
tations at the workshop as well as prior experience. This
was a practical necessity, and should not be construed to
minimize the importance or relevance of social or ethical
discussions which will be an important component of
decision-making around the use of gene drive, as they would
be with any important decision or policy that deals with the
environment and human health.
Although the discussions were wide ranging, there was
a great deal of commonality in the resulting analyses.
Human health considerations related to disease transmis-
sion were considered important for analysis in the context
of the risk assessment. Harms to livestock health were
considered unlikely, but the potential for altered pathogen
transmission was identified as a relevant endpoint for
assessment. Although harmful impacts to biodiversity were
generally considered unlikely due to suppression or alter-
ation of A. gambiae populations, there was consensus on
the important ecological interactions that should be consid-
ered in specific risk assessments.
It is also important to consider that there may be differ-
ent perspectives on environmental protection goals, moral
or ethical considerations for the use of the technology.
This effort used existing environmental protection goals as
a baseline for consideration and did not make any de novo
attempt to address ethical or social implications from the
deployment of gene-drive technology. The authors would
encourage these considerations to be taken up in appro-
priate forums, and particularly in communities where the
use of gene-drive technologies would likely occur. This
article therefore also provides a basis to support contin-
ued engagement of affected communities, and other rele-
vant stakeholders as gene-drive technologies continue to
be developed.
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